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Abstract: Attention is a process that alters how cognitive resources are allocated, and it allows 12 
individuals to efficiently process information at the attended location. The presence of visual or 13 
auditory cues in the environment can direct the focus of attention towards certain stimuli; even if 14 
the cued stimuli are not the individual’s primary target. Samson et al. [1] demonstrated that seeing 15 
another person in the scene (i.e. a person-like cue) caused a delay in responding to target stimuli 16 
not visible to that person: “altercentric intrusion”. This phenomenon, they argue, is dependent 17 
upon the fact that the cue used resembled a person as opposed to a more generic directional 18 
indicator.  The characteristics of the cue are the core of the debate of this special issue. Some 19 
maintain that the perceptual-directional characteristics of the cue are sufficient to generate the bias 20 
whilst others argue that the cuing is stronger when the cue has social characteristics (relates to what 21 
another individual can perceive). The research contained in this issue confirms that human 22 
attention is biased by the presence of a directional cue. We discuss and compare the different 23 
studies. The pattern that emerges seems to suggest that social relevance of the cue is necessary in 24 
some contexts but not in others, depending on the cognitive demand of the experimental task. One 25 
possibility is that the social mechanisms are involved in perspective taking when the task is 26 
cognitively demanding, whilst they may not play a role in automatic attention allocation. 27 
Keywords: Reflexive Attentional Shift; Visual attention, Altercentric intrusion 28 
 29 
..A towel, it says, is about the most massively useful thing an interstellar hitchhiker can have [..] 30 
wrap it around your head to avoid the gaze of the Ravenous Bugblatter Beast of Traal (a 31 
mind-bogglingly stupid animal, it assumes that if you can't see it, he can't see you - daft as a brush, 32 
but very very ravenous). 33 
 34 
Douglas Adams 35 
1. Introduction 36 
 37 
The Ravenous Bugblatter Beast of Traal in Douglas Adams's The Hitchhiker's Guide to the 38 
Galaxy [2] is a beast so stupid that it thinks that if a person cannot see it then it cannot see that 39 
person. Therefore, we can cover our eyes with a towel to avoid being attacked. Here, Douglas 40 
Adams is playing with the idea that people are aware that they might be biased to favour their own 41 
view, and he surprises the reader by offering a reverse scenario. However, it is possible that people 42 
are a little bit like the Ravenous Bugblatter Beast of Traal in that they cannot help being affected by 43 
what other people see. This is the key tenet of a social perspective-taking view of attention. 44 
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Attention can be oriented by different cues, such as arrows [3] or eyes [4]. These cues can 45 
produce an automatic (or reflexive) rather than voluntary orienting of attention [5].While voluntary 46 
shift depends upon the observer's expectations and intentions, reflexive shifts of attention (RAS) are 47 
associated with sensory stimulation and generated by unforeseen changes in the visual field, 48 
particularly by the abrupt onset of stimuli, which elicit reorienting and saccadic eye movements [3].  49 
In particular, taking in consideration the notion of “Theory of Mind” [6], it has been suggested 50 
that attention can be reflexively biased towards where another person is looking (Fig. 1), causing 51 
errors or slower responding when reporting what we see if this is different from what the other 52 
person sees [7]. 53 
 54 
 55 
Fig 1. Our attention is directed towards where this person is looking and pointing. 56 
 57 
To investigate the RAS phenomenon, Samson et al. [1] devised a semi-experimental paradigm. 58 
The general setup consists of a 3D virtual room presented on a computer screen with the back, left 59 
and right walls visible. A human avatar placed in the centre of the room is used as a cue to direct 60 
attention towards either the left or right wall of the room. During the experiment, discs appear on 61 
either the left, right or both walls. The participants’ task is to indicate (in each trial) how many discs 62 
they or the human avatar can see. As the participants see both the left and right walls, they can see 63 
all of the discs. However, since the human avatar faces left or right, it can only see the discs placed 64 
on one side. Therefore, there are consistent and inconsistent trials: In consistent trials, the number of 65 
discs visible to the participant and to the avatar is the same. In inconsistent trials, the participant can 66 
see some discs that the human avatar cannot (Fig 2). Participants respond as quickly as possible, 67 
with responses > 2000ms counted as errors. Reaction Times (RTs) and errors are the dependent 68 
variables.  69 
 70 
   71 
 72 
(a)      (b) 73 
Fig 2. An example of consistent (a) and inconsistent (b) trials in the dot perspective task. 74 
 75 
The authors confirmed the existence of egocentric bias: reporting what the avatar can see is 76 
affected by what the participant can see. However, in addition they also found interference (i.e. 77 
longer RTs and more errors) in inconsistent trials even when participants had to report how many 78 
disks they can see; this interference is defined as "altercentric intrusion". Various egocentric biases 79 
are known and have been extensively studied, for example starting with Piaget's three mountain 80 
task [8]. An altercentric bias is, by contrast, a less well documented phenomenon. Both can, in 81 
theory, coexist. 82 
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To explain the altercentric intrusion effect, Samson et al. [1] advanced the “Perspective-Taking” 83 
theory, asserting that people spontaneously incorporate the viewpoint of others. Since then, several 84 
studies have reported supporting evidence for this theory [9-11]. 85 
Nuku and Bekkering [11], Teufel et al. [12] and Furlanetto et al. [13] found that altercentric 86 
intrusion is present when participants are asked to judge their own perspective while the human 87 
avatar was believed to be able to see. On the other hand, intrusion was not present, when the human 88 
avatar was believed to be unable to see (e.g. its line of sight obscured). 89 
These findings, supporting the Perspective-Taking theory, run counter to the “Perceptual” 90 
theory, which argues that the perceptual features (i.e. the direction of other’s face/nose/posture) are 91 
sufficient to explain attentional orientation [14-16].  These studies found that human avatars 92 
spontaneously orient attention of the observers even when the human avatars cannot see the stimuli 93 
either because a physical barrier prevents the view, as in Cole et al. [14] or when the cue employed in 94 
the dot perspective task does not have a mental state (e.g. an arrow, or a camera) as in Wilson et al. 95 
[16]. According to this theory therefore, the effects showed in the dot perspective task are due to 96 
domain-general processes rather than perspective taking. 97 
In an effort to bridge this gap and clarify the mechanism behind social perception, Michael and 98 
D'Ausilio [17] suggested that the dot perspective task itself may engage both Theory of Mind and 99 
domain-general processes. Social and non-social clues would therefore engage the same attentional 100 
process eliciting RAS, despite being represented by two different functional systems. 101 
Further research has focused on whether the perspective taking may not be a spontaneous 102 
phenomenon. If this is the case, then RAS would be only modulated by perceptual characteristics of 103 
the cue, while perspective taking would be due to top-down processes [18-21]. These authors noted 104 
that the human avatar employed by Samson et al. [1] was unable to generate attentional shift when 105 
the target discs were presented within 300 ms from the presentation of the cue. The authors therefore 106 
concluded that attentional shift may be induced by perspective taking, but this cannot be defined 107 
“reflexive” as it requires some time to occur.  108 
Inspired by the aforementioned literature in which similar results may be interpreted either in 109 
agreement with the perceptual characteristics of the cue (perceptual position) or its social 110 
characteristics (social position), the journal Vision recently hosted a special issue titled "Reflexive 111 
Shifts in Visual Attention". This special issue (www.mdpi.com/journal/vision/special_issues/RAS) 112 
provided a place where some of those studies, supporting old and new theories behind RAS are 113 
collated. This review is therefore intended as an overview of contemporary research on the RAS 114 
phenomenon, summarizing each of the contributions to this special issue on RAS and briefly 115 
outlining directions for future research. 116 
2. Visual attention and Reflexive Attentional Shift 117 
We are constantly surrounded by a world containing more information and objects than what 118 
our cognitive system can process. Attention allows to choose and select certain stimuli and ignoring 119 
others. The complexities of attention are evidenced by neuroimaging data showing how attention is 120 
carried out by a network of anatomical areas and is therefore neither the property of a single centre 121 
nor a function of the brain as a whole [3]; in particular it has been shown that the existence of three 122 
networks related to different aspect of attention, alerting orienting and executive controls [3, 22]. As 123 
pointed out by Carrasco [22], attention seems to be influenced and facilitated also by previous 124 
knowledge and assumption of the surrounding world. This places attentional processes halfway 125 
between perception and cognition.  Our attention can therefore be influenced by different factors, 126 
which can be grouped in two main categories: Bottom-up (or exogenous) factors, in which attention 127 
is usually deployed reflexively due to the characteristics of the scene and stimuli's salience; and 128 
Top-down (or endogenous) factors, in which attention is often deployed voluntarily in accordance 129 
with specific tasks or goals; and with the task or goal having a strong influence on where the 130 
participants allocate their attention.  131 
 132 
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In her contribution to this special issue, Zhaoping [23] provided further insights on the 133 
mechanisms behind visual attention orientation. Expanding previous results which showed that a 134 
target stimulus is localised quicker if it is presented to one eye only [24]. The author investigated 135 
whether the ocularity contrast of a visual input, a feature often hardly visible, captures attention 136 
exogenously; where ocularity of a visual input refers to the difference of visual input between the 137 
two eyes. Results from the study showed that, regardless of its task relevance, a visual location with 138 
a strong ocularity contrast attracts attention.  These findings are in line with previous literature 139 
which supports the idea that primary visual cortex creates a bottom-up saliency map to guide 140 
attention exogenously. According to these studies, target characteristics, such as changes in 141 
luminance, motion or colour, are combined in a spatial map which highlights the most salient aspect, 142 
as consequence of which attention is reflexively shifted [25-26]. 143 
 144 
Extending Zhaoping’s study [23], Burnett et al. [27] examined specific characteristics of 145 
exogenous cues that are either more or less likely to draw attention. They used a dual-task paradigm 146 
to test whether luminance or equiluminant colour change modulated motion and colour 147 
discrimination effects. Their results showed that the motion and colour tasks were affected 148 
differently by the two cues: motion validity was more strongly affected by luminance than colour 149 
cues, whereas the colour validity showed no difference in effect between luminance and colour cues. 150 
These results have implications for our understanding of how low-level properties of cues could 151 
influence visual attention, with the authors suggesting that “cues which engage the same visual 152 
channel as the target are more effective in enhancing target processing at the cued location”. 153 
Moreover, if further work supports this view that exogenous cueing is not a unitary process, then 154 
this will need to be considered when studies which apply cueing tasks. 155 
3. Reflexive Attentional Shifts: perceptual or social mechanisms? 156 
The fact that attention can be reflexively oriented by the incidental information provided by cues 157 
and contextual information provided during a cueing task is the basis for one of the core debates 158 
examined in this special issue: whether reflexive biases in attention, are modulated by social or 159 
perceptual processes. While there is a body of evidence showing that attention can be reflexively 160 
biased towards where another person is looking, causing consequently errors or slower responding 161 
when reporting what we see if this is different from what the other person sees [7], there is no 162 
consensus within the literature on what causes this attentional shift. The contributions to this special 163 
issue attempt to clarify the factors involved in the RAS phenomenon and, as a result, provide 164 
evidence in support of one or other interpretation.   165 
3.1 Perceptual interpretations of RAS 166 
Langton [28] hypothesized that the inconsistent results between perceptual and social 167 
interpretation could be due to the use as a directional cue of a computer-generated avatar, or a 168 
photograph of a person, rather than a real person. While it can be expected that an avatar (or a 169 
photograph of a person) generates orienting effects, this does not necessarily mean that there is a 170 
spontaneous attribution of visual perspective. Thus, Langton's work [28] is in line with Wiese et al.'s 171 
[29] and Gardner et al.'s [21] studies suggesting that participants must believe that the avatar 172 
represents an intentional agent in order to take its point of view. If intentionality is not attributed to 173 
the cue, then its directional effects are due just to its perceptual features. Langton [28] set up two 174 
experiments both employing the dot perspective paradigm [1] but replacing the avatar with 175 
photo-realistic stimuli in experiment 1, and with real persons in experiment 2 (Fig 3).  176 
 177 
 178 
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 179 
Fig 3. Example of the stimuli used by Langton [28]. 180 
 181 
Both experiments tested two main conditions: seeing condition in which the gazer was able to 182 
see either the screen at its left or its right; and non-seeing condition, in which barriers were placed 183 
between the gazer and the screens. 184 
Hence, Langton’s results [28] support the hypothesis that the interference found in previous 185 
studies may be due to the perceptual feature of the directional cues, not from an implicit mentalising 186 
of the other's perspective.   187 
Participants were, in fact, faster on consistent trials (the number of target dots visible to 188 
participants equal to the number of dots visible to gazer) rather than inconsistent trials (where 189 
number of dots visible to the gazer differ from the number of dots visible to the participant) in both 190 
seeing and non-seeing condition in the two experiments. On another contribution to this special 191 
issue, Cole et al.'s findings [19] supported Langton's results [28] in favour of the "Perceptual theory". 192 
Cole et al. [19] pointed out how the choice of specific tasks and cues may influence the altercentric 193 
intrusion phenomenon. In their work, Cole et al. [19] argued that to attribute RAS to social factors, 194 
the interference should take place in all settings in which the avatar sees the same stimuli as the 195 
participants. To test this assumption, the authors incorporated the presence of an avatar within two 196 
other classic visual cognition tests. Regardless of whether the avatar could or could not see the same 197 
things of the participants, no cuing effects emerged; showing that an avatar cannot generate 198 
reflexive directional shifts in all task types. Directional cueing effects emerged in authors' study only 199 
when more perceptually salient cues were used, such as a schematic representation of a face (Fig 4). 200 
 201 
 202 
Fig 4. One of the stimuli employed by Cole et al. [19]. 203 
 204 
Overall, Cole et al. [19] showed that the "perspective taking" effect observed in the dot 205 
perspective task does not generalize to other paradigms. Cole et al.'s results [19], therefore, 206 
supported Gardner's position [21] that the avatar itself it is not sufficient to generate spontaneous 207 
attribution of visual perspective at least when the target is presented within a short interval after the 208 
avatar.  209 
The abovementioned studies seem to point towards a theory, in which the chosen tasks, stimuli 210 
(and the relative cognitive demands as it will be shown later) may play a key role in generating the 211 
RAS phenomenon. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by Albonico et al. [30] and Kulke’s [31] 212 
contributions to this special issue, which underlined the importance of choosing the appropriate set 213 
of tasks and stimuli when the aim is to measure attentional shift. 214 
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Albonico et al. [30] provided evidence that the deployment of focal attention depends on the 215 
interaction between the task demand and the type of stimuli. Furthermore, they show that this 216 
process is mainly reflexive. The authors measured focal attention by means of the cue-size effect 217 
magnitude, which is the inverse relationship between the size of the focus of attention and the 218 
concentration of resources within the attentional field. For the task demand, the authors compared 219 
detection with discrimination tasks, the former requiring less attentional resources than the latter. 220 
For the stimuli type, the authors compared high-level representational stimuli (letters) with 221 
low-level representational stimuli (geometric shapes). Furthermore, the authors manipulated the 222 
SOA between a cueing and a target stimulus. Results show that high-level representational stimuli 223 
elicit a larger cue-size effect than low-level representational stimuli when the task is a detection task; 224 
whilst there is no difference between the two types of stimuli in the discrimination task. These 225 
findings may explain the different findings in the literature on the deployment of focal attention: a 226 
discrimination task may not put in evidence the differences between high- and low-level 227 
representational stimuli. In addition, considering the temporal delay between cueing stimuli and the 228 
target, the authors found that the cue-size effect enhances at short SOAs; suggesting that focal 229 
attention is mainly a reflexive process. 230 
In line with Albonico et al. [30], Kulke [31] pointed out the importance of comparing the results 231 
of different paradigms (the fixation shift paradigm and the gap-overlap paradigm) used to measure 232 
attentional shift between stimuli that are often used as predictors for developmental outcomes. 233 
Hence, Kulke [29] investigated the effect of eccentricity (defined as the angular distance from the 234 
centre of the visual field) and target size on attentional shift latencies (the time taken from the 235 
appearance of a target to the beginning of a saccade in response to that target). The author 236 
systematically manipulated the target's eccentricity (great and small eccentricity) and size (big size 237 
and small size) measuring the potential differences in eye-movements’ responses to stimuli of 238 
different sizes and eccentricities within the two aforementioned paradigms. Results showed that 239 
eccentricity and target size affected the attentional shift. Subjects responded more slowly to the big 240 
target stimuli when it was closer to the centre of the screen (big target size, small eccentricity) and 241 
vice-versa (small target size, great eccentricity). However, no significant differences in refixation 242 
latency between targets were found when the target stimuli's size was scaled in proportion to the 243 
eccentricity. This is the case of the fixation shift paradigm (big size, great eccentricity) and of the 244 
gap-overlap paradigm (small size, small eccentricity). The author, therefore, concluded that the 245 
results recorded in experiments based on the fixation shift paradigm and on the gap-overlap 246 
paradigm may be compared as long as stimulus size is scaled in proportion to their eccentricity. 247 
 248 
3.2 Social interpretations of RAS 249 
The studies reviewed so far explain the RAS phenomenon in terms of the perceptual features of 250 
the directional cue. The following reviewed - studies published in the special issue - support instead 251 
the social interpretation. Morgan et al. [32] focused on the importance of attributing a mental state to 252 
a human avatar employed as a cue. In particular, they tested whether the avatar's gaze mediates the 253 
shift of attention. Teufel et al. [33] showed that when the human avatar is not believed to be capable 254 
of seeing, it does not interfere with our attention; while, when the human avatar is perceived as a 255 
"viewer", its gaze does affect our attention. Although Morgan et al. [32] share with Teufel et al. [33] 256 
the same position, they underlined that Teufel et al.'s work [33] presented a number of weaknesses 257 
that could limit the interpretation in favour of the social account of RAS. Hence, Morgan et al. [30] 258 
specifically noted that Teufel et al. [33] (1) used a response time task. This method may not be 259 
sensitive enough to detect subtle attentional shifts; (2) employed a blocked design: the two 260 
conditions of viewing and not-viewing were in blocks instead of interleaved. This experimental 261 
design could have led participants to suppress orienting in response when the Other was not been 262 
able to see; (3) encouraged the attribution of a mental state to the Other by providing leading 263 
instructions.   264 
 265 
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In their instructions, Teufel et al. [33] encouraged the participants to take the viewpoint of the 266 
Other. In this way, participants may have believed that they were expected to answer differently to 267 
the two conditions. To overcome the above potential problems, Morgan et al. [32] (Fig 5) (1) used a 268 
change detection paradigm; (2) interleaved trials between conditions; (3) did not provide 269 
instructions to the participants.  270 
 271 
 272 
Fig 5. The experimental procedure employed by Morgan et al. [32]. 273 
 274 
While controlling for these potential confounding variables, Morgan et al.'s results [32] were in 275 
line with Teufel et al.’s [33]. Participants were influenced by the Other's gaze only when s/he was 276 
able to see. However, Morgan et al. acknowledge that their results are not consistent with similar 277 
studies conducted by Cole et al. [14, 19], which showed that mental state does not influence 278 
attentional orienting. The reason of different results is not clear yet; however, this can be due to the 279 
use of different paradigms and stimuli manipulation adopted within each study, in order to test the 280 
different mental state conditions.  281 
In their contribution to this special issue, Actis-Grosso and Ricciardelli [34] highlighted the role 282 
of social factors in generating RAS. The authors tested whether stimuli known to automatically 283 
orient visual attention, such as arrows and averted gazes (Fig. 6), also modulate the correspondence 284 
problem, which is the problem of ascertaining to which objects in one frame correspond the objects 285 
presented in a subsequent frame. The authors hypothesized that the stimuli known to trigger RAS 286 
should also drive the correspondence problem. Interesting for the purpose of this special issue, is the 287 
comparison between the arrows and the averted gazes. To this end, the authors compared the effects 288 
of arrows and averted gazes with those of lines which should be considered as a baseline. 289 
 290 
 291 
Fig 6. The three types of stimuli used in Actis-Grosso and Ricciardelli [34]. Each panel displays 292 
the eight directions conveyed by the different stimuli and the eight possible positions of stimulus 293 
presentation. 294 
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 295 
It emerged that all the three types of stimuli generate a RAS effect and that they all modulate 296 
correspondence problem. Furthermore, the effect generated by arrows and gazes is stronger than 297 
those generated by lines. Most interestingly, it was found that the effects of arrows and averted 298 
gazes are equivalent when they are in a comparable condition; however, when there is a directional 299 
conflict of information, rather than weakening, the effect of the gazes becomes stronger than those of 300 
arrows. As can be seen in Fig. 6, the rectangular boxes which encompass the gazes always have a 301 
horizontal direction. A directional conflict occurs when the gazes point towards any non-horizontal 302 
position. 303 
In line with Morgan et al. [32], Actis-Grosso and Ricciardelli concluded that stimuli known to 304 
automatically orient visual attention, such as gaze direction and arrows, influence the 305 
correspondence problem more than lines. Furthermore, gazes are more powerful than arrows in 306 
generating RAS when there is a spatial conflict. 307 
The role of social mechanisms and of perspective taking in generating RAS was also supported 308 
by Gardner et al. [35].  The authors examined assumptions inherent the sub-mentalising account of 309 
the altercentric intrusion phenomenon during level 1 Visual Perspective Taking (VPT). VPT is 310 
defined as the ability to understand that other people have a different line of sight to us, whereas 311 
VPT level 2 is the understanding that two people viewing the same item from different points in 312 




Fig 7. Visual Perspective Taking (VPT) level 1 and Visual Perspective Taking (VPT) level 2. 317 
 318 
Specifically, the researchers manipulated cue stimuli in a way that aimed to influence 319 
visuospatial attentional orienting but not mentalising. Specifically, they presented avatar cues in two 320 
positions: gaze-maintained avatars where body position was consistent with gaze direction and 321 
gaze-averted avatars where body position was perpendicular to gaze direction (Fig 8). 322 
 323 
 324 
Fig 8. Gaze-maintained and Gaze-averted avatars used by Gardner et al. [35]. 325 
 326 
 Their first experiment presents several interesting findings; some of which are consistent with 327 
previous work and others which are less expected. Firstly, the finding that attention orienting was 328 
present only for longer SOAs (stimulus onset asynchrony) indicates that attentional orienting might 329 
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not be reflexive. Secondly and perhaps more pertinent to the focus of this study, the gaze-averted 330 
cues showed an effect of validity on RT: participants were faster when the target appeared at the 331 
cued location compared to the non-cued locations. There was instead no effect of validity on RT 332 
when the gaze-maintained cues were employed. In a second experiment, they examined the 333 
difference in reaction times between consistent and inconsistent trials, finding no effect for avatar 334 
stance. They take this finding as evidence that cue features (such as gaze/stance orientation) that 335 
influence attentional orienting do not necessarily affect level 1 visual perspective-taking. The 336 
potential dissociation between perspective-taking and attentional orienting has important 337 
implications for both implicit mentalising and sub-mentalising accounts that have been put forward 338 
to explain this phenomenon. 339 
 340 
4. Additional factors involved in RAS 341 
 342 
 Further contributions to this special issue, rather than focusing on the social-perceptual 343 
debated, placed their focus on the different variables that may affect and influence RAS and the 344 
attentional cueing paradigms such as temporal information, changes in tonic alertness and 345 
inter-individual differences.  346 
 347 
4.1 The influence of temporal and auditory information 348 
 349 
Among those contributions, Laidlaw and Kingston [38] investigated how ignoring temporal 350 
information eliminates reflexive spatial orienting. In particular, the authors investigated whether the 351 
interaction between temporal and spatial attention modulates the Reflexive Attentional Shift; where 352 
temporal attention refers to the process of allocating brain resources on the predicted onset of an 353 
incoming event [39]. To investigate this interaction, the authors explored the foreperiod effect [40]. 354 
This is the effect by which the cuing of a target generates an inverse relationship between subjects’ 355 
reaction times and the time between the cue and target appearance: longer time between the stimuli 356 
results in shorter reaction time.  357 
The authors systematically manipulated spatial characteristics of the cue (arrows - to elicit reflexive 358 
attention - vs letters - to elicit volitionally attention); SOA (100, 500 and 1000 ms) and congruency of 359 
the cue (congruent vs incongruent).  360 
The results showed the emergence of a foreperiod effect and of a spatial cueing effect with both 361 
arrows and letters, but only at longer SOAs and only in congruent conditions. On the other hand, 362 
with shorter SOAs and in incongruent conditions the foreperiod effect did not occur whilst the 363 
spatial cuing effect occurred only with letters.  364 
The authors, therefore, concluded that only reflexive spatial attention orienting is modulated by 365 
the implicit changes in temporal attention, while volitional spatial attention is not. Thus, the way in 366 
which spatial and temporal attention interact must be taken in serious consideration during visual 367 
attentional studies. 368 
Extending Laidlaw and Kingston's research [38], Hayward and Ristic [41] investigated two 369 
different processes that may be present in any study involving spatial cueing: tonic alertness and 370 
voluntary temporal preparation. In this study, the authors tested whether changes in tonic alertness 371 
and voluntary temporal preparation affect attentional orienting. They confirmed that task-relevant 372 
social gaze and non-social arrow cues affected spatial attention, with no differences between the two 373 
cues (Fig 9).  374 
 375 
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 376 
Fig 9. Example of cues and task sequence employed by Hayward and Ristic [41]. 377 
 378 
Interestingly, they found that the magnitude of the generated attentional shift may be 379 
modulated by high tonic alertness, while no differences were found with voluntary temporal 380 
preparation. Even if overall those results seem to contrast with Laidlaw and Kingston [38], both 381 
studies seem to converge on the idea that the cue generated attentional shift appears to remain 382 
robust across different cueing task settings. However, the task parameters seem to play an important 383 
role into modulating the magnitude of the attentional orienting effect elicited by the different types 384 
of cues. 385 
On a similar line of enquiry, Klein [42] focused on the control of visual attention by auditory 386 
stimuli. In a series of cross-modal experiments using the cueing paradigm, the author presented to 387 
the subjects an auditory cue indicating the position of a target manipulating the cue informative 388 
value (congruent vs incongruent with the location of the target) and its onset asynchrony (SOA). 389 
The results showed that the informative value of the auditory cue affected the target 390 
localisation. This suggests that localizable auditory stimuli exogenously (rapidly and automatically) 391 
capture visual attention. In addition, it was found that subjects were faster to identify the cued target 392 
at short SOA, while participants were slower when SOA was between 500 and 1000 ms. The author 393 
therefore concluded that for SOA within this temporal window, the exogenous shift of attention is 394 
overcome by the endogenous one.  395 
Furthermore, in another series of experiments the author manipulated the auditory cue 396 
changing its pitch rather than its location (Fig 10). The cue was centrally presented but its glide 397 
frequency was manipulated to indicate the target position. The glide frequency could have been 398 
informative (raising tone indicating top location and vice-versa) or uninformative. Subjects were 399 
faster in the informative conditions, showing that changes in the glide of the auditory cue shift 400 




Fig 10. Example of the apparatus employed by Klein [42]. 405 
 406 
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4.2. Inter-individual and laboratory-real world differences. 407 
 408 
  Inter-individual differences and the differences between laboratory settings and the real 409 
world are usually overlooked when attentional orienting and/or perspective taking are investigated. 410 
In their contribution to this special issue, Bukowski and Samson [43] explained some of the 411 
individual differences in terms of the ability to handle conflict between two conflicting perspectives, 412 
and the variability in the strength of the egocentric perspective. The study used a visual 413 
perspective-taking task and a large sample. Results showed that individuals varied in their difficulty 414 
in considering another person’s differing perspective. A cluster analysis suggested four underlying 415 
profiles which can be placed within a two-dimensional space. The two axes are the ability to handle 416 
conflict and the relative attentional focus on the self rather than the other person's perspective.   417 
In line with Bukowski and Samson’s findings [43], another contribution to this special issue 418 
seems to highlight the importance of inter-individual differences. Prpic [44] investigated in fact, how 419 
perceiving musical note values causes spatial shift of attention in musicians (Fig 11). The author 420 
contributed to the discussion on RAS taking into consideration the Spatial-Numerical Association of 421 
Response Codes (SNARK) effect. This is the phenomenon by which perceiving numbers can affect 422 
the allocation of spatial attention, causing a leftward target detection advantage after perceiving 423 
small numbers and a rightward advantage for large numbers. The aim of the study was to test 424 
whether the effect can be reproduced in musicians when reading musical notes instead of numbers. 425 
The visual representation of the duration of musical notes shares with the numbers a symbolic 426 
representation that goes from left to right. Specifically, images depicting whole and half notes 427 
represent relatively long duration, while eighth and sixteenth notes represented short duration. 428 
 429 
 430 
Fig 11. Task sequence employed by Prpic [44]. In this example, the stimulus was the half note and the 431 
target appeared on the right visual field. 432 
 433 
 The author found an advantage in detecting a leftward (vs. rightward) target after perceiving 434 
small (vs. large) musical note values; suggesting that musicians process numbers and note values in 435 
a similar manner. Future studies on RAS might benefit of these findings for example testing whether 436 
the SNARK is affected by the presence of an "Other" on either side of the stimuli presentation.  437 
 438 
Finally, Blair et al. [45] presented a way for assessing individual instances of cover attentional 439 
orienting in response to gaze and arrow cues. The authors investigated whether gaze-following 440 
behaviour occurs in laboratory tasks as frequently as in natural settings. In a first experiment, the 441 
presence of costs or benefits in cue trials was calculated – i.e. the proportion of RT responses falling 442 
more than 1 SD outside of the performance of neutral control trials. The authors, then, replicated the 443 
study in a second experiment with a different directional cue serving as the control comparison.  444 
The results of both experiments suggest that attentional orienting in gaze-cuing tasks is infrequent, 445 
occurring in less than 50% of trials. However, although benefits and costs occurred on less than 50% 446 
trials, consistently with the literature, results indicated that more benefits relative to costs occurred 447 
on valid trial (stimulus appears on targeted location) (Fig 12) and that more costs relative to benefits 448 
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occurred on invalid trials (stimulus appears on  non-targeted location). Furthermore, results 449 
showed no differences between gaze cues and arrow cues. 450 
These results have important implications for the use of cueing tasks in the lab and the 451 
theoretical explanations that come from their use and the analysis method employed presents a 452 
useful starting point for examining the frequency of attentional orienting in future gaze-cueing 453 
studies within and across real world and laboratory investigations. 454 
 455 
 456 
Fig 12. Example of cues and of a valid trial employed by Blair et al. [45]. 457 
 458 
5. Conclusions and future directions  459 
On one hand, observers are good at knowing where another person is looking [46]. On the other 460 
hand, there are also limits and mistakes in reasoning about the role of viewpoint in a scene [47]. This 461 
paper focused on how attention is affected by the presence of another individual in the scene. 462 
Researchers have shown that this other individual may act as a cue directing our attention; however, 463 
there is no agreement on how this process works. 464 
Some researches show that the other individual has the same role as any other directional cues 465 
that can bias attention, like for example an arrow. Other researches, instead, show that observers are 466 
specifically sensitive to the social characteristics of the other individual, and therefore are affected by 467 
the content of another person's viewpoint. In this review we consider the contributions appeared in 468 
the special issue on Reflexive Attentional Shift (RAS) published in Vision. Establishing whether RAS 469 
is a perceptual or a social process is important because RAS is used as a measure of perspective 470 
taking and mental state attribution in both developmental and clinical contexts. For example, 471 
perspective taking may be used to evaluate children development in reference to Autism Spectrum 472 
Disorder (ASD) [48-50]. The contributions of this special issue allow the reader to reach deeper 473 
insights into the RAS phenomenon, not only focusing on the importance of understanding the 474 
nature of the process behind it, but also providing further theories and knowledge about different 475 
variables that may influence or elicit RAS.  476 
Taking all evidence into account, the contributions confirm that human attention is biased by 477 
the presence of a directional cue in the scene. By analysing the different experiments, it appears that 478 
the social relevance of the cue may be necessary in some contexts but not in others. 479 
Specifically, the papers in this special issue helped outline a number of avenues for future 480 
research to clarify and solve this debate. For example, the role of participant belief about the other’s 481 
perspective may play an important role in the interpretation of the RAS phenomenon and future 482 
research will need to take into consideration. For example, Langton [28] Wiese et al. [29] and 483 
Gardner et al. [21] pointed that participants must believe that the directional cue represents an 484 
intentional agent in order to take its point of view. In this case, however, the shift of attention is not 485 
"reflexive" but is a voluntary, top-down, process. 486 
In addition, the high level of individual variation needs to be accounted for in future work. For 487 
example, Prpic [44] showed that perceiving musical note values causes spatial shift of attention in 488 
expert musicians but not in non-experts. Similarly, Bukowski and Samson [43] found individual 489 
differences in the ability to handle conflicting perspectives.  490 
Furthermore, the research in this issue distinguishes among attentional orienting, level 1, and level 491 
2 perspective-taking [35]. It may indeed be the case that social factors differential effects on each of the 492 
aforementioned processes. Therefore, it will be important going forward for researchers to be 493 
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specific about which type of perspective-taking is under examination. Finally, evidence from the 494 
current issue suggests that certain effects might depend on the cognitive demand of the 495 
experimental task [19, 35, 51], indicating that social factors are especially involved when the task is 496 
cognitively demanding, whilst they may not be necessary in the other cases.  497 
Additional contributions presented in this special issue move away from the social-perceptual 498 
debate trying to provide further insight about the nature of the cues and other variables that may 499 
influence RAS and attentional cueing paradigms [27, 31, 42]. Among those, further confirmations 500 
that the cognitive demand of a task plays an important role in attentional orienting have been 501 
provided. Specifically, Albonico et al. [30] provided evidence that the deployment of focal attention 502 
depends on the interaction between the task demand and the type of the directional cues.  503 
In conclusion, the contributions to the special issue greatly improved our understanding of the 504 
RAS phenomenon, and opened up new avenues of investigation, which may allow for a deeper, 505 
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